Gifted filmmakers such as Joshua Oppenheimer, director of The act of killing, are attempting to use the power of documentary to provoke social and political change in post-conflict settings. What roles do interventionist filmmakers play in processes of national reconciliation and transitional justice? Can The act of killing really be a catalyst for change in Indonesia? This article contends that the genocide documentary is a form of antagonistic intervention that warrants systematic and critical re-evaluation. It holds that claims regarding the remedial impact of documentaries such as
Introduction
Rudolph Rummel, author of Death by government, feels he belongs to a world of specialized researchers concerned with the arbitrary foreclosure and systematic termination of human life. 1 The inhabitants of Rummel's special world are not necessarily driven by morbid preoccupation; rather, what an independent jury referred to as a staggeringly brave film that exposes political injustice and opens a painful dialogue on Indonesia's genocide. Documentary filmmaker A. J. Schnack simply referred to The act of killing as 'the film that cannot be ignored'. 3 What roles do interventionist filmmakers-defined here as filmmakers attempting to provoke social and political change and to advance the cause of human rights in post-conflict settings-play in processes of national reconciliation and transitional justice? Can The act of killing really be a catalyst for change in
Indonesia?
This article contends that the genocide documentary is a form of antagonistic political intervention that warrants systematic and critical re-evaluation. It holds that claims regarding the remedial or healing impact of documentaries such as The act of killing are difficult to substantiate, the main problem being attribution, cause and effect. The historical 'truth' of genocide has become a power-laden tool fought over by politicians, activists, lawyers, filmmakers and many others whose competing claims are based on fragmented memories of survivors, perpetrators, witnesses and bystanders. 4 Interventions through film cause ripple effects and have the power to move political questions or strategic goals such as transitional justice into the visual sphere. 5 Given the visual nature of contemporary politics James Johnson argues that the practice of documentary, both filmic and photographic, is central to our understandings of conflict and justice. 6 A brief history of the Indonesian genocide is required before proceeding with an analysis of genocide documentary as intervention.
The People's Republic of China was celebrating National Day on 1 October 1965 when the first reports of an attempted coup d'état in Indonesia began to circulate. A failed coup d'état that came to be known as the 30 September Movement enabled the Indonesian military to conduct an internal purge within its own ranks as well as to systematically arrest or murder real or suspected communists. The purge was led by the army but the killings were also outsourced to various nationalist-religious youth organizations such as Pemuda Pancasila and Ansor, with the worst massacres taking place in Java and Bali. 7 The destruction of the once powerful Indonesian
Communist Party took place in the context of the wider US war against communism in East Asia. 8 
US bombing operation Rolling Thunder was underway in Vietnam, and the US Central Intelligence
Agency was active in Indonesia, working with the US embassy to produce lists of communist targets and providing strategic support to factions within the Indonesian armed forces. 9 Political polarization and social cleavages were extreme in the 1960s, and the very nature of the Indonesian nation-communist, Islamist, nationalist-was at stake. At the height of the communist period in 1964 cadres were mobilizing the countryside, encouraging poor peasants to occupy land and attracting urban supporters by spearheading attacks against Dutch, British and American companies. 10 Clashes ensued between landlords and peasants, religious zealots and moderates, and many ordinary Indonesians saw the temporary lawlessness of 1965 as an opportunity to settle old 4 scores. By March 1966 the Communist Party was broken and outlawed. Indonesia's first president Sukarno was outmanoeuvred and supplanted by General Suharto, whose triumph led to the establishment of a New Order regime (1966−98) characterized by developmental authoritarianism.
The collapse of the left brought an abrupt end to the political differences and cultural polemics that had shaped Indonesian art, thought and creative expression in the post-independence (post-1945)
period. 11 From 1966 a new official version of events was imposed upon the public with an intensity and sophistication that left a lasting impression. Contrarian (unofficial) accounts of the communist purge were limited by a combination of total propaganda-the communist treason (as it was presented) featured in schoolbooks, official documents, national rituals, ceremonies, commemorations, films and annual television programs, and national museums-the pervasive climate of fear and the public desire to separate the trauma of the past from the prosperity of the present.
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The mystery and horror of the communist purge inspired director Joshua Oppenheimer to spend nearly a decade searching for Indonesia's genocidaires. He worked in towns and villages throughout northern Sumatra, infiltrating networks of perpetrators and convincing these 'national heroes' (if we believe the New Order propaganda) to perform for the camera. Oppenheimer's film project is intended to be a shocking and disturbing indictment of a generation of unrepentant killers, yet it centres upon a small group of provincial thugs and gloating gangsters led by Anwar Congo. In the beginning of the film Anwar is shown dancing on a rooftop, the location where he claims to have carried out countless executions (garrotting his victims) while under the influence of drugs and alcohol. The director has been criticized for making little attempt to evaluate the truth of Anwar's testimony. 13 Oppenheimer's core research subjects (who are all male) were tricked, in a sense, into revealing their self-deception on camera; they were given elaborate wardrobes, props, equipment and technical support, and then encouraged to draw inspiration from their favourite Hollywood genres prior to the staging of any re-enactments of the killings of 1965−66. The result is a hallucinatory and nightmarish visual experience; fantasy-driven re-enactments are interspersed with 5 raw footage from Medan city, exposing the vulnerabilities and paradoxes of the contemporary urban landscape in Indonesia. By the end of Oppenheimer's ambitious and problematic film it is clear that a powerful new method of storytelling had been created; this film will serve as a key reference point for filmmakers for many years to come.
As evidenced by Oppenheimer's 2014 BAFTA speech, intervention in the mind of the director seems to follow the logic of a synchronous circuit, where trauma based on revealed truth leads to transitional justice. Each component in the circuit has a corresponding political argument. This article will examine three interrelated arguments linking genocide documentary and political intervention: (1) re-traumatization, (2) power-laden truths, and (3) the narrowing of impunity gaps.
This article contributes to debates about genocide and intervention by presenting evidence from Indonesia, including rare interviews with the protagonists in Oppenheimer's award winning film, surveys of Indonesian audiences, and data gathered from a global online petition as well as Chinese microblogs in order to better understand how audiences respond to genocide documentaries and why it is so difficult to generate political action outside the theatre.
Genocide documentary and re-traumatization
The genocide documentary genre will always carry the risk of re-traumatization, as visual interventions and the devices of film often work in unexpected ways. 14 One of the earliest examples of documentary cinema is American director Robert Flaherty's Nanook of the North (1922).
Flaherty 'manipulated reality to give a picture of reality', cinematically restaging events, reconstructing images to match testimony, and radically intervening in arctic Eskimo affairs in order to achieve dramatic effect.
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Paula Rabinowitz's study was published over two decades ago, although one could replace her analysis of Nanook of the North with The act of killing and draw similar conclusions. Generally speaking, both Flaherty and Oppenheimer made films with foreign funding, both intervened in cultures other than their own-introducing tools and techniques that would not otherwise have been used in the filmmaking process-resulting in a spectacle of 6 otherness conforming to Western or, at the very least, non-indigenous patterns of vision and narrative. 16 Oppenheimer created a genre bending film by indulging his research subjects, giving The repetitious re-enactments of torture and garrotting in The act of killing have generated mixed reviews ranging from the aesthetic and moral outrage of what they did, thus helping to demystify violence and unmask a corrupt regime. 26 The problem with
Roosa's argument is the lack of attention paid to the degrees of emptiness that follow cinematic intervention. If and when the mask comes off, who will be there to deal with the consequences, to steer and manage Indonesia's victim-offender dialogue and traumatic confrontation with the past?
Clear global guidelines exist for the provision of psychosocial assistance in post-genocide settings-former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia-based on the replication and adaptation of the Harvard Program in Refugee Trauma. In Cambodia significant care has been taken to establish and monitor outreach and victim support programs. 27 In Indonesia, where Oppenheimer claims to have confronted, provoked and unmasked a regime of terror, there is little information available about reconciliation efforts, the provision of psychosocial assistance or outreach programs for victims and survivors.
Power-laden truths and the reclamation of history
Historical truths are, as Charles Maier writes, always plural and political, always interpretive and subjective, derived from different questions asked by different individuals at different points in time. 28 The social science imperative is that these truths are based on triangular relationships between researchers, data, and readers (or viewers). Maier concludes that historians are best positioned to use data in the attempt to eliminate that which is not true, that which does not abide by the normal rules of evidence, that which is based on nothing more than fancy, prejudice or imagination. Janet Walker, a specialist in 'trauma cinema', notes that the evidence gathered from protagonists in The act of killing is of questionable value for those concerned with the separation of truth from lies. The fantasies of the genocidaires and their performances do not conform to 'conventional truth-seeking documentary practice', and yet Walker believes that there is a role, however paradoxical, that fictive film strategies can play in processes of truth and justice. 29 Parker
Tyler's timeless critique suggests that political documentary has always existed on the borderline between art and actuality. Filmmakers are expected to aim for the logical arrangement of a given order of facts, although the most imaginative documentaries rearrange and distort facts, wilfully or as a consequence of submerged prejudice, in order to create a glorified poetics of truth. 30 Documentaries concerning the Indonesian purge in the 1960s, the Cambodian killing fields in the 1970s and the more recent 'no fire zones' in Sri Lanka contain varying degrees of factual rearrangements. 31 Biologist Tanguy Chouard, writing for the esteemed journal Nature, argues that an estimated 200,000 free downloads is evidence that The act of killing has been diffused throughout Indonesia, shaking the country's bedrock of violence and 'brutal regime of impunity', and jolting the country's collective conscience into ending nearly half a century of media silence. 32 Criminologist Nicole
Rafter believes The act of killing breaks through decades of silence in order to perform two key functions. First, the film leads to the formation of collective memories of the Indonesian genocide, and second, it constitutes 'a form of public criminology through addressing monstrous crimes in ways that push us toward ethical action', ultimately bringing an end to impunity. 33 As discussed below, these conclusions are incorrect. During an interview with John Roosa in January 2014
Oppenheimer explained that the decision to film Indonesian executioners was made in order to shatter the myth of the heroic national triumph against communism. The American director and his anonymous Indonesian film crew encouraged perpetrators to boast about the gruesome methods they used against defenceless civilians, so as 'to make a film that would intervene in this economy of impunity, fear and glorification'. role in the communist purge. Their boastful, obscene and often dubious confessions will not end impunity, will not shake bedrocks of violence, will not shatter national myths, and will not bring truth and reconciliation to Indonesia. Third, Oppenheimer's intervention has not ended national silence about the genocide because there is no national silence to end. In the years after the purge a repressive censorial regime emerged and yet citizens spoke out against the crimes of the 1960s and victims carried out searches for missing family members. Unlike the situation in Cambodia, where nearly twenty-five per cent of the population was slaughtered or died of starvation in the period from 1975−79, the majority of Indonesians survived the communist purge and knew all about the activities in their neighbourhoods. In both Indonesia and Cambodia, as David Chandler notes, the hole into which the past is buried has only been partially dug and will never be fully filled. reopen the debate about history and human rights in order to reclaim truth. 41 After the apology and amnesty John Roosa was able to interview hundreds of former political prisoners and create an archive in Jakarta. The archive serves a truth-telling function but Roosa nevertheless warns that this is impressionistic evidence at best. 42 There is no way of establishing what a representative sample would be because no one was counting the losses during the communist purge. By approaching the issue with sensitivity and caution Roosa draws a clear line between his qualified empirical work and
Oppenheimer's 'apocalyptic fever dream' project. consciousness and contemporary self-understanding'. 50 John Torpey believes that the framework and very foundation upon which post-war Germany rests requires a certain minimal consensus about the past. The Historikerstreit was more than a historical quarrel; it was a highly politicized struggle between liberals and conservative revisionists to shape contemporary popular discourse 14 and achieve broad consensus. In Indonesia the context is very different. When Joshua Oppenheimer and his unnamed collaborators took it upon themselves to ignite an important global debate about Indonesia's formative historical trauma there was no tribunal equivalent to the ECCC in Cambodia, and no grand public reckoning to match the Historikerstreit. 51 In the decades that followed the Indonesian genocide the triumph over communism was celebrated, propagandized and memorialized, and the perpetrators of mass crimes evaded formal punishment. Impunity does not however mean that everyone escaped judgment. All of the Indonesian survivors of the purge knew that something had happened in their neighbourhoods; decades after the purge there were lingering suspicions, stigmatizations and sometimes even reprisals, with entire families and villages politically implicated (terlibat) in the communist purge.
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Robert Lifton studied the psychology of genocide and found that Nazi doctors who turned from healers to killers relied on two key neurological traits: doubling (sometimes referred to as the second self) and numbing. 53 The special traits that enabled these scientifically relaxed killers to persist and endure would not have been shared by the large numbers of informal and untrained members of Indonesian death squads caught up in the events of 1965−66. In the absence of doubling and numbing many of the killers would have been consumed by their crimes, and many indeed went mad. Jonah Weiner argues that The act of killing engages a group of men 'for whom guilt has no normal way of expressing itself', and that while the film may come across as a jarring and unnerving jumble at times, it constitutes a radical and important departure from the typical investigative documentary. 54 The transitional justice movement is faltering if we take Cambodia and the ECCC as an example, however there will likely be more experiments in hybrid tribunals in the future. Burma and Sri Lanka are possible testing grounds, and Janet Walker believes that Indonesia's landscape of impunity will continue to be narrowed. Self-confessed executioners such as Anwar Congo can be legally indicted and subjected to court proceedings because 'amnesties can be overturned and international tribunals constituted'. 55 Groups such as ELSAM, the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute
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(YLBHI) and the Jakarta based Coalition for Truth and Justice (consisting of forty-seven nongovernment organizations) are at the forefront of the battle against impunity and pledge to continue to engage with the public, with or without the cooperation of the Indonesian government.
Empirical analysis
Genocide documentaries such as Enemies of the people and The act of killing tell stories, offer visual representations of the cultural other, and create subversive images that can encourage a range of responses from spectators and participants alike. Arguably the most important impact of documentary films is the intellectual debate that they provoke. For instance, when asked whether
The act of killing can really catalyse change by narrowing impunity gaps and bringing justice to Indonesia, May Adadol Ingawanij, an expert in contemporary Thai cinema from the University of Westminster, replied 'perhaps insofar as it leads to the promotion of discourse'. 56 Cambodian
American filmmaker Kalyanee Mam agrees that the story told by Oppenheimer enables audiences
to have deeper conversations about the legacy of the communist purge in Indonesia and to try to understand the culture of impunity that exists today. 57 She is cognizant of the fact that political documentary has always existed on the borderline between art and actuality, and warns that the art of film is being compromised by impact agendas that position films politically as means to an end.
The act of killing is a technically and stylistically brilliant film that offers viewers a window into another world, and yet Kalyanee Mam has reservations about the characters that are central to the conflict being portrayed by Oppenheimer. The characters are difficult to connect with, their testimony seems embellished, and Oppenheimer's accusatorial approach puts punishment ahead of understanding and reconciliation. On the night of the 2014 Oscars, after learning that his film did not win the award for best documentary, Oppenheimer told reporters that he still felt like a winner because his film 'caused a level of change in Indonesia beyond anything we could have hoped for'. 63 The was reported that through a network of underground distributors the film had been viewed by millions of Indonesians, but that only a few (admittedly interesting) accounts from viewers in the city of Yogyakarta were available. 65 The two film screenings and discussions I attended in December 2013 provided insights into the differential attitudes of university students in Java, Indonesia. I sampled forty students between the ages of 18 and 25. 66 The majority of respondents (65 per wrecked by powerful elites in Indonesia. To borrow from Rabinowitz, I would argue that the film is actually wreckage upon wreckage, compounding the multilayered problem of historical distortion and revisionism in Indonesia. 67 One member of the audience I interviewed in December 2013 struggled to come to terms with the conflicting messages in the film, as well as the film's unorthodox, episodic structure and multilinear plot. 68 The respondent expressed unease about the periodic outbursts of laughter prompted by the film, and wondered whether 'this was just a cruel comedy'? 'Is it better to just leave the past alone, rather than make a mockery of it'? Jill Godmilow proclaims that uninitiated foreign audiences will leave the theatre with a 'fantasy degree in Indonesian history' after watching The act of killing. 69 Oppenheimer's cinematic style. Three bloggers characterized the film as an absurdist fantasy, three were swept away by the film's brilliance, and another three felt that the genocide re-enactments were unconvincing.
One particularly sceptical Chinese blogger suggests that the ending of the film is 'artificial', referring to the final rooftop scene that shows Anwar Congo revisiting the site where he claims to have executed many of his victims. Anwar is filmed as he suffers a traumatic reaction, retching uncontrollably for several minutes. It is, according to Oppenheimer, the moment where the mask is off. 77 The scene marks the end of a long and harrowing journey for Anwar Congo, the symbolic finale that proves the whole exercise worthwhile. Oppenheimer's cinematic intervention exposes the cruelty of the killers and forces them to conjure and exorcise their demons in order to prove that there is still hope for truth, national reconciliation and justice in Indonesia. But was it redemptive vomiting, a sign of genuine remorse, or a convenient grand finale? Oppenheimer insists the rooftop scene is authentic. One prominent filmmaker who wishes to remain anonymous is absolutely certain the scene is contrived. 78 Oppenheimer's PhD thesis provides a vital clue. He wrote that the goal of his interventionist project was to use film to inspire a process of remembrance, resistance and redemption carefully assembled through his ethnographic subjects. for Oppenheimer-there were simply too many parts to reassemble-and so he narrowed the focus of his art house documentary. The film has raw power and a lavish style, and yet it is drained of political context and has stripped away the international dimension of the Indonesian conflict.
Questions as to how high-level political plans (such as those to eradicate the communist threat in Indonesia) converge with national and local plans, and how this leads to extreme violence, are left unanswered. This is problematic precisely because of the repeated claims about political change, historical revisionism, national reconciliation and transitional justice made by the film's directors and executive producers.
Oppenheimer's intention has always been to ensure that 'perpetrators are lured by the apparatus of filmmaking into naming names and revealing routines of mass murder hitherto obscene to official histories'. 89 Anwar Congo and Herman Koto, the two lead actors who were so easily lured into making The act of killing, confirmed in separate interviews that they initially agreed to work with Joshua Oppenheimer because they supported his doctoral research. 90 Neither believed at the time that their amateur project would become an Oscar nominated global sensation. Anwar and
Herman are still very fond of Oppenheimer although they feel forgotten and to an extent betrayed.
Anwar insists that he is satisfied with his portrayal in The act of killing even though he has suffered from anxiety and somatic malfunction since the film debuted at the Toronto Film Festival in 2012.
Anwar is resigned to the fact that journalists and human rights campaigners from around Indonesia have his mobile number and residential address, and that calls for retributive justice are only growing louder. Herman is determined to defend Anwar against the legal advocates and rights campaigners who are pursuing him. 91 The main message from Anwar is that he feels powerless, like a shadow (bayangan), and fears being cornered (terpojok) and entrapped. 92 Herman Koto takes all the credit for the mise-en-scène, particularly the casting, choreography and development of Arsan dan Aminah, the amateur film-within-a-film that inspired the gruesome re-enactments by perpetrators that Oppenheimer now presents as a kind of therapeutic process of 'virtual Nobel prize' in that they give rise to the peculiar situation where good intentions are rewarded before they have translated into actual deeds or hard facts. 101 Reminiscent of Robert Flaherty a century ago, Oppenheimer 'soaked himself in his material', patiently living with his research subjects to the point of intimacy.
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Unlike Flaherty's arctic
Eskimo project, however, The act of killing was made on the basis of a highly politicized intervention in a post-genocide context by an outsider using deceptive techniques in order to infiltrate a local Indonesian community. The director seems absolutely certain that his cause is just and methods are sound. In other professions the approach to genocide research is more balanced.
For instance Richard Wright found that forensic archaeologists responsible for the impartial investigation of mass graves often reflect upon the morbidity of their work, the psychological consequences of their research, and sometimes even question their feelings in relation to the process of uncovering the dead and 'the evil context in which they lie'.
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Joshua Oppenheimer claims that it was never his intention to make a film about a particular genocide. Rather, he argues that 'when terror exerts a terrible hold on the present precisely because it was made spectral by virtue of being obscene to all official narratives and accounts, imagining becomes the main job of the historian'. 104 The director, brilliant as he is, fails to compensate for the fact that antagonistic interventions such as those undertaken in the making of The act of killing have perverse effects. Cinematic intervention may in fact add to the spectral and the obscene, especially in the case of wildly imaginative art house projects which are theoretically tantalizing but highly obscure, and suffer from deficits of causal plausibility that no amount of imagination can or even should stand to rectify. As Hayden White aptly concludes, imagination that is not disciplined by its subordination to the rules of evidence is dangerous, particularly dangerous for the historian (or the genocide documentary filmmaker challenging official versions of history) who 'cannot know that what he has imagined was actually the case, that it is not a product of his imagination in the sense in which that term is used to characterize the activity of the poet or writer of fiction'. 105 Perhaps the greatest conceit of all is Oppenheimer's claim that his interventionist film, made with insufficient regard for methodological or ethical standards in research, has done what all previous research projects failed to do: end impunity, unmask a regime, bring meaningful justice to victims and heal the nation. 
